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THE ITALIAN MODEL TO FIGHT COVID-19: 
REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGULATORY 
INFLATION, AND THE COST OF ONE-SIZE-
FITS-ALL LOCKDOWN MEASURES 
FERNANDA NICOLA* & GINO SCACCIA** 
What has come to be known worldwide as the Italian model to fight COVID-19 was 
a series of governmental measures undertaken in early 2020 to reduce the contagion of a 
deadly virus ravaging the northern regions of Italy—especially Lombardy, Veneto, and 
Piedmont.  These measures included quarantine or lockdown throughout the Italian territory, 
together with the revamping of hospitals, followed by economic recovery packages to address 
the standstill of the national economy.  This Article focuses on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Italian model.  By highlighting the initial missteps, we can understand how this 
turned into a productive national and regional coordination model through a learning-by-
monitoring process.  However, the Italian model was implemented at a high cost, due to the 
overextension of executive action and the lack of territorial differentiation.  After the President 
of the Italian Republic suggested stronger parliamentary involvement in the executive 
lockdown measures, the legislative branch began to give full legal force to the governmental 
provisional regulations.  Rather than tailoring the regulatory measures according to the 
impacted regions, the government imposed a long and widespread lockdown throughout the 
country by means of an overregulation and bureaucratization of social life, which produced 
high human and economic costs for the country.  In hindsight, the Italian government did 
not narrowly tailor the lockdown measures or lift them in those regions with limited 
infections.  As a result, this widespread and micromanaged governmental action has created 
new and effective administrative processes of regional–national cooperation in public health, 
but it has also triggered distrust toward the way in which public authorities managed the 
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INTRODUCTION 
What experts have called the “Italian model to fight COVID-19” can be 
summarized in three steps: diminish viral contagions through quarantine and 
widespread, generalized, integral lockdown; increase the capacity of medical 
facilities; and adopt social and financial recovery packages to address the 
pandemic-induced economic crisis.1  Even if other nations initially viewed the 
Italian model with suspicion, it has since become an effective model—
especially in subnational cooperation between regions, cities, and the central 
government.  However, this model also came at a high cost for the Italian 
economy and was very much criticized by legal scholars due to the restriction 
of civil liberties, which created tensions in the Italian constitutional framework.  
This Article fills the gap in the literature in assessing the institutional strengths 
and the pitfalls of this model. 
In Part I, after depicting the constitutional framework of emergency powers, 
we focus on what has been heralded as Italy’s decentralized or institutional 
cooperation2 across its different levels of government, regions, provinces, and 
cities in fighting COVID-19.  Despite early missteps and conflicts between the 
national government and the regions in coordinating public health, both 
institutions have learned how to make decentralization more effective. 
 
 
1. See Mauro Pasquini, Mismanagement of the Coronavirus Emergency and the Italian Model, 
IMPAKTER (Mar. 19, 2020), https://impakter.com/mismanagement-of-the-coronavirus-emer
gency-and-the-italian-model/. 
2. See DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., ROADMAP TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE: MASSIVE SCALE 
TESTING, TRACING, AND SUPPORTED ISOLATION (TTSI) AS THE PATH TO PANDEMIC RESILIENCE 
FOR A FREE SOCIETY 50 (2020), https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/roadmap
topandemicresilience_final_0.pdf. 
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In Part II we address the cost of the lockdown in terms of the overregulation 
and bureaucratization in fighting the spreading of COVID-19.  In particular, 
we show how the management of the health emergency has contributed to 
the concentration of powers in the executive branch.  Such concentration also 
spurred competence conflicts among different levels of government often 
resolved by adjudication, rather than through institutional collaboration.  
Finally, the extensive and nonselective lockdown through the Italian territory, 
including the less affected southern regions with little contagion, halted the 
country’s economy with long-term implications for the country’s public debt.  
In the long term, the inadequacy of “one-size-fits-all” measures adopted by 
the government not only created different distributive outcomes by 
heightening the inequality among Italian regions but also diminished Italian 
citizens’ level of trust in the government. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, EMERGENCY POWERS,  
AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 
The Italian Constitution, unlike the famous models of Article 48 in the 
Weimar Constitution of 1919,3 Article 16 of the French Constitution,4 Article 
116 of the Spanish Constitution,5 and Article 48 of the Hungarian 
Constitution,6 does not include a specific provision regulating a state of 
emergency.  Except for a declaration of war, when Parliament can vest in the 
Executive all necessary powers with no constraints, the Italian Constitution 
does not provide for extraordinary emergency powers; it does not allow either 
the suspension of fundamental rights or the delegation of powers unmoored 
from parliamentary control to the Executive.  This constitutional omission is 
not by chance.  In fact, Article 77 provides a general legislative measure for 
facing “extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency.”7  This law decree—
 
3. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, 
art. 48 (Ger.). 
4. 1958 CONST., art. 16 (Fr.). 
5. C.E., B.O.E. n. 116, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
6. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], 
ALAPTÖRVÉNY, Apr. 25, 2011, art. 48.  
7. Art. 77 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [CONSTITUTION] (It.), translated in SENATO DELLA 
REPUBLICA, CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC 20–21, http://www.senato.it/documen
ti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (“The Government may not, without an 
enabling act from the Houses, issue a decree having force of law.  When the Government, in 
case of necessity and urgency, adopts under its own responsibility a temporary measure, it shall 
introduce such measure to Parliament for transposition into law.  During dissolution, Parliament 
shall be convened within five days of such introduction.  Such a measure shall lose effect from 
 
3. NICOLA & SCACCIA (ITALY)_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2021  6:25 AM 
56 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [73:1 
which must be adopted by the Council of Ministers and signed by the President 
of the Republic—is immediately effective.  However, it needs to be transposed 
into law by Parliament within sixty days from its publication otherwise it 
expires and becomes void with retroactive effect.8  As a result, the Italian 
constitutional framework ensures that no infringement upon fundamental 
rights is allowed by the executive branch without parliamentary oversight and 
the prior scrutiny of the President of the Republic.  The President can also 
refuse to sign patently unconstitutional decrees.  In a nutshell, during the 
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian constitutional framework, as 
we will describe below, has been pushed to its very limit. 
A. The Spread of the COVID-19 Pandemic as a National Emergency 
The first case of COVID-19 in Italy appeared in late January when 
Chinese tourists from Wuhan were hospitalized in Rome after passing 
through Milan.  The same day they were hospitalized, the Italian Minister of 
Health Roberto Speranza announced the suspension of flights to and from 
China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to prevent the spread of the virus.9  
Italy was the first European Union (EU) country to ban flights to and from 
China 10  In hindsight, this ban occurred too late and gave the pandemic 
enough time to spread in northern Italy.11 
Before the first COVID-19 case appeared, an unusually high number of 
pneumonia cases emerged in Codogno, a small town in the Lombardy 
region.12  Soon afterward, a researcher at the company Unilever was the first 
Italian patient diagnosed with COVID-19.13  Authorities quickly confirmed 
the outbreak in Codogno—the “Wuhan of Italy” as it has been called—and  
social life came to a halt.14  Codogno’s mayor adopted several ordinances 
 
the beginning if it is not transposed into law by Parliament within sixty days of its publication.  
Parliament may regulate the legal relations arisen from the rejected measure.”). 
8. Id. 
9. See Italy’s Hopes for Closer China Ties Hit by Coronavirus Flight Ban Rift, STRAITS TIME (Feb. 
10, 2020, 10:11 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/italys-hopes-for-closer-
china-ties-hit-by-coronavirus-flight-ban-rift. 
10. See Decreto ministeriale 30 gennaio 2020, n.203, G.U. Feb. 1, 2020, n.26 (It.).  
11. See Mélissa Godin, Why Is Italy’s Coronavirus Outbreak So Bad?, TIME (Mar. 10, 2020, 
2:18 PM), https://time.com/5799586/italy-coronavirus-outbreak/. 
12. See Emilio Parodi & Angelo Amante, As Coronavirus Slams Italy, Paralysis and Anxiety Spread, 
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-italy-paralysis-insight/as-corona
virus-slams-italy-paralysis-and-anxiety-spread-idUSKCN20M2WB (Feb. 28, 2020, 1:44 PM). 
13. See Godin, supra note 11. 
14. See Sean Coughlan, Lessons from the Lockdown: What Happens When Everyday Life Suddenly Changes?, 
BBC (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/dj3jonuhi1/coronavirus-year-of-the-mask. 
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requesting citizens to stay home and wear masks when going out.15  A few 
days later, other small municipalities started to implement similar 
measures.16  Although Codogno had thirty-five new cases per day at the 
beginning of the outbreak, by the second week of March, the city registered 
only few infections.17  In this first phase of the outbreak, the command-and-
control chain was totally centralized in the government. 
On January 31, 2020, the Italian government declared a state of national 
emergency,18 on the premise that ordinary measures would have been unfit 
to cope with such a pervasive and severe crisis.19  A state of national 
emergency enables various institutions—including the National Department 
of Civil Protection (Protezione Civile),20 the Ministry of Health,21 and regional 
and municipal governments22—to take extraordinary measures to respond to 
the pandemic.  In early February, the Ministry of Health adopted a series of 
ordinances.23  Some of these ordinances restricted civil liberties to preserve 
public health, such as the lockdown where the government implemented 
active surveillance over those citizens who had close contact with COVID-19  
 
 
15. See Explained: How Italy Is Handling Coronavirus Outbreak, LOCAL (Feb. 22, 2020, 10:00 
AM), https://www.thelocal.it/20200222/explained-how-italy-is-handling-co. 
16. See Greata Privitera, Italy Looks at Life After Lockdown—with Fear and Reluctance, 
POLITICO (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/08/italy-
looks-at-life-after-lockdown-with-fear-and-reluctance-176490. 
17. See Colleen Barry, Italy’s Coronavirus Ground Zero Sets Virtuous Example, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 
13, 2020, 10:33 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-03-13/italys-
coronavirus-ground-zero-sets-virtuous-example. 
18. See Decreto legislativo 2 gennaio 2018 n.1, G.U. Jan. 22, 2018, n.17 (It.); Italy Govt 
Agrees State of Emergency after Confirmed Coronavirus Cases – Govt Source, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-health-italy/italy-govt-agrees-state-of-emergency-
after-confirmed-coronavirus-cases-govt-source-idUSR1N282044. 
19. See Italy Declares State of Emergency Over Coronavirus, FRANCE 24 (Jan. 31, 2020, 2:10 PM), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20200131-italy-declares-state-of-emergency-over-coronavirus. 
20.  For emergency powers, see arts. 7, 24 D.Lgs. n.1/2018 (It.).  See generally Emergenza 
Coronavirus, PROTEZIONE CIVILE, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/home (last visited Mar. 
4, 2021) (providing general information regarding the Protezione Civile and its role). 
21. See Novel Coronavirus, MINISTERO DELLA SALUTE, http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuo
vocoronavirus/homeNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=english (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).  The 
Ministry of Health’s powers are found in Art. 32 Legge 23 dicembre 1978 n.833, G.U. n.360 (It.). 
22. See Art. 117 Decreto legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n.112, G.U. Apr. 21, 1998, n.92 
(enabling the president of the region to adopt provisional emergency ordinances); Art. 50 
Decreto legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n.267, G.U. Sept. 28, 2000, n.227 (enabling mayors to adopt 
provisional emergency measures). 
23. See generally Decreto legge 23 febbraio 2020, n.6, G.U. Feb. 23, 2020, n.45 (codifying 
a range of health ordinances previously adopted by the health minister). 
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patients and over those who arrived in Italy after being in the areas ravaged by 
the pandemic in China. 
When the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global 
pandemic,24 Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte enacted various decrees 
(DPCMs) that are not subject to parliamentary control or signed by the 
President of the Republic.25  In his effort to fight the spread of the virus, the 
Prime Minister adopted DPCMs that limit fundamental rights enshrined in 
the Italian Constitution, such as personal liberty, freedom of movement, and 
freedom of assembly.26  Although constitutional rights are not absolute, only 
Parliament has the authority to limit them.27  Both scholars and political 
commentators have criticized the adoption of these initial DPCMs, objecting 
that they were devoid of the force of law and displayed a fragile legislative 
basis.28  However, the Council of Ministers adopted the first decree with the 
full force of law to contain the health crisis on February 23, 2020 (D.L. n. 
6/2020).29  That decree set the regulatory framework for the government to 
act during the first phase of the emergency. 
Between February 23 and April 10, the Prime Minister adopted nine decrees 
and the President signed four law decrees to implement lockdown measures, 
demonstrating the Italian government’s quick response to a pandemic that 
disproportionately affected Italy’s northern and central regions.30  The legal and 
 
24. See WHO Announces COVID-19 Outbreak a Pandemic, WHO (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.
euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/
3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic. 
25. See arts. 5, 17 Legge 23 agosto 1988, n.400, G.U. Sept. 12, 1988, n.214 (determining the 
powers of the President of the Council of Minister and the regulatory powers of the government). 
26. See Arianna Vedaschi & Chiara Graziani, Coronavirus Emergency and Public Law Issues: An 
Update on the Italian Situation, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 12, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/
coronavirus-emergency-and-public-law-issues-an-update-on-the-italian-situation/. 
27. Id. 
28. See Francesca Rescigno, La Gestione del Coronavirus e L’impianto Costituzionale. Il fine Non 
giustifica Ogni Mezzo, 2020 OSSERVATORIO COSTITUZIONALE 253 (It.); Gaetano Azzariti, I Limiti 
Costituzionali Della Situazione D’emergenza Provocati dal Covid-19, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA (Mar. 27, 
2020), https://www.questionegiustizia.it/articolo/i-limiti-costituzionali-della-situazione-d-emer
genza-provocata-dal-covid-19_27-03-2020.php. 
29. See generally D.L. n. 6/2020 (It.). 
30. See id. (providing authorities, in all municipalities in which at least one person was 
positive, power to promote containment measures proportionate to the evolution of the 
epidemiological situation); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 23 febbraio 2020, 
n.294, G.U. Feb. 23, 2020, n.45 (implementing D.L. n. 6/2020, establishing containment 
measures in Lombardy and Veneto, and providing for additional tax benefits and reliefs); 
Decreto ministeriale 24 febbraio 2020, n.20A01299, G.U. Feb. 26, 2020, n.48 (implementing 
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political framework did not change since the adoption of Law Decree no. 19 of 
March 25, 2020.  This decree was adopted to overcome the constitutional 
challenges that commentators had raised on D.L. n. 6/2020; specifically, that 
it left the powers of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte unrestrained, thus causing 
an eclipse of civil liberties.31 
 
the tax benefits established by D.P.C.M. 23 Feb., 2020); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri 25 febbraio 2020, n.306, G.U. Feb. 25, 2020, n.47 (introducing new measures for all 
northern regions, such as the cancellation of sporting events and the establishment of online 
classes for all educational infrastructures); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 1 
marzo 2020, n.346, G.U. Mar. 1, 2020, n.52 (rationalizing the set of interventions made 
throughout the Italian national territory); Decreo legge 2 marzo 2020, n.9, G.U. Mar. 2, 2020, 
n.53 (addressing the negative effects the virus produces on the national socio-economic 
framework by financially supporting citizens and firms); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri 4 marzo 2020, n.394, G.U. Mar. 4, 2020, n.55 (containing new measures to limit the 
COVID-19 spread throughout the entire country); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri 8 marzo 2020, n.417, G.U. Mar. 8, 2020, n.59 (declaring Lombardy and the 
municipalities from different northern regions of Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Reggio Emilia, 
Rimini, Pesaro e Urbino, Venezia, Padova, Treviso, Novara, Asti, Alessandria, Verbano-
Cusio-Ossola, and Vercelli were in the “red zone,” limiting the freedom of movement); Decreto 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 9 marzo 2020, n.421, G.U. Mar. 9, 2020, n.62 (so-called 
“I am staying home decree,” expanding the measures adopted on March 8 to the entire Italian 
territory, making the entirety of Italy red zone); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
11 marzo 2020, n.429, G.U. Mar. 11, 2020, n.64 (closing all commercial and retail activities 
except for grocery stores, basic need stores, and services including pharmacies and para-
pharmacies); Decreto Legge 17 marzo 2020, n.18, G.U. Mar. 17, 2020, n.70 (so-called “Cure 
Italy Decree,” containing multiple financial provisions aimed at enhancing the national health 
system and funding the Protezione Civile and other institutions involved in the emergency; also, 
suspending the payment of taxes and other financial obligations while creating financial 
measures that supported furloughed workers, giving credit to families and micro, small, and 
medium firms); Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 22 marzo 2020, n.521, G.U. Mar. 
22, 2020, n.76 (stopping all industrial and commercial production activities (with some 
exceptions) and prohibiting all citizens from moving to a municipality different from the one in 
which the person was residing, except for work needs, absolute emergencies, or health reasons); 
Decreto Legge 25 marzo 2020, n.19, G.U. Mar. 25, 2020, n.79 (providing the possibility of 
adopting measures for only specific parts of the national territory in order to contain health 
risks and the spread of the contagion).  Each measure listed in the March 25 decree, once 
adopted, is not supposed to last for more than thirty days; however, the measures are repeatable 
and can be changed multiple times till the end of the state of emergency.  D.L. n. 19/2020.  The 
decree increases penalties and fines for those who do not respect the restrictions imposed.  Id. 
31. See Michele Ainis, Il bisticcio del potere, LA REPUBBLICA (Mar. 3, 2020), https://rep.rep 
ubblica.it/pwa/commento/2020/03/03/news/coronavirus_parlamento_leggi-250153929/ 
(explaining the necessity of the restrictions to supersede the “freedom of movement” envisaged 
in Article 16 of the Constitution); see also Ilenia Massa Pinto, La tremendissima lezione del Covid-19 
 
3. NICOLA & SCACCIA (ITALY)_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2021  6:25 AM 
60 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [73:1 
Although the Prime Minister’s Decrees introduced meaningful measures, 
the government adopted the most powerful set of policies with two law 
decrees: the “Cure Italy Decree”32 and the “Liquidity Decree.”33  Together, 
these law decrees offered a stimulus package of 425 billion euros (around 
$500 billion) to revamp the economy and to help support families, workers, 
and enterprises.34  The government adopted these financial measures in 
consultation with the European Commission.35 
When public health experts noticed on April 26 that the pandemic curve 
was going down, another DPCM started the so-called Phase 2.36  From May 
4 onward, the government lightened the stay-at-home measures, allowing 
businesses to reopen and social life to awaken.37 
 
(anche) ai giuristi, QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.questionegiustizia.it/arti
colo/la-tremendissima-lezione-del-covid-19-anche-ai-giuristi_18-03-2020.php (arguing from a 
constitutional perspective that the central government’s response to the pandemic at that point 
had done nothing but exacerbate the situation); Marco Olivetti, Coronavirus.  Così le norme contro il 
virus possono rievocare il “dictator,” AVVENIRE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.avvenire.it/opinioni/
pagine/cos-le-norme-contro-il-virus-possono-rievocare-il-dictator (declaring it is necessary for 
the public to be critical of the government’s response, because to do otherwise would be 
“tantamount to putting the Constitution in quarantine”); Francesco Clementi, Coronavirus, quando 
l’emergenza restringe le libertà meglio un decreto legge che un Dpcm, IL SOLE 24 ORE, https://24plus.ilsole
24ore.com/art/coronavirus-quando-l-emergenza-restringe-liberta-meglio-decreto-legge-che-
dpcm-ADfpIxC (June 24, 2020) (expressing concern that the use of DPCMs, which are easily 
challenged in any regional administrative court, renders the legal response by the government 
legally fragile, creating great uncertainty about the stability of the new legal processes structuring 
the day-to-day lives of Italians during the pandemic); Marco Plutino, I Decreti di Conte sul 
Coronavirus sono sconosciuti alla Costituzione, IL RIFORMISTA (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.ilriformi
sta.it/i-decreti-di-conte-sul-coronavirus-sono-sconosciuti-alla-costituzione-62221/ (asserting while 
the norms furthered by the government’s response to coronavirus are important, they are 
secondary to the norm enshrined in the Italian Constitution). 
32. D.L. n. 18/2020 (It.). 
33. Decreto Legge 8 aprile 2020, n.23, G.U. aprile 8, 2020, n.94.  
34. See Diletta Tega & Michele Massa, Fighting COVID 19 – Legal Powers and Risks: Italy, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/fighting-covid-19-legal-
powers-and-risks-italy/ (discussing purpose of “Cure Italy” decree and how the allocated 25 
billion euros may be used for managing COVID-19); Italy Enacts “Liquidity Decree” to Further 
Manage COVID-19, EY TAX NEWS UPDATE: GLOB. EDITION (Ernst & Young Glob. Ltd., 
London, U.K.), Apr. 10, 2020, at 1 (summarizing “liquidity” decree as injecting 400 billion 
euros into the Italian market).  
35. D.L. n. 18/2020 (It.); D.L. n. 23/2020 (It.) 
36. Coronavirus: Italy’s PM Outlines Lockdown Easing Measures, BBC (Apr. 27, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52435273. 
37. Id. 
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B. Conflicts Between Central and Regional Governments 
The central and regional governments share legislative and administrative 
powers.38  This means that it is up to the central government to design 
principles that regions must apply and implement.  The regional governments 
conduct the administrative management of health services, like hospitals, and 
they are bound to follow and implement the guidelines of the Ministry of 
Health, a branch of the central government.39 
The emergency created by the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the 
limits of the Italian model of distribution of competencies among the different 
levels of government.  Indeed, in the management of the health crises, besides 
state and regional authorities, there are other institutional subjects, such as 
municipalities, provinces, prefects, and civil protection, with overlapping public 
health competencies.  The need for more coordination among the different 
institutional levels was underlined in the National Plan for Preparedness and 
Response to an Influenza Pandemic, drafted in 2006 and never updated since 
then.40  However, as soon as the COVID-19 crisis exploded, and the public 
institutions were forced to move from theory to practice, missteps and 
administrative inefficiencies emerged.  Regional measures misaligned with 
national ones, delays and overlapping competencies in the implementation of 
state and regional acts on the municipal level, and administrative gridlocks all 
caused distrust and disorientation among citizens. 
After the COVID-19 outbreak in Codogno, several governors of Italy’s 
northern regions claimed that the virus was just a seasonal flu and did not take 
immediate quarantine measures.  In downplaying the situation, on February 
25, Attilio Fontana, Governor of Lombardy41 and a member of the right-wing 
populist party Lega, declared that it was undoubtedly a difficult situation, but 
not dangerous.42  Indeed, at the beginning of the outbreak, the central 
 
38. As for public health, it is listed among the twenty-three shared legislative competencies 
between state and regions.  Art. 117 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
39. Andrea Poscia et al., Italy, in ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICES IN EUROPE 49, 54 (Bernd Rechel et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK507325/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK507325.pdf (“The National Prevention Plan is 
drafted by the Ministry of Health and signed in agreement with the State-Regions Conference.  
Each region has to then transpose the national plan in its own regional prevention plan.”). 
40. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL PLAN FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO AN 
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (2006), http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_501_ulte
rioriallegati_ulterioreallegato_0_alleg.pdf. 
41. Presidents of the regions are usually called ‘Governors’ of the regions. 
42. Mattia Ferraresi, Italy’s Politicians Are Making the Coronavirus Crisis Worse, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/09/italy-covid19-coron
avirus-conte-salvini-epidemic-politicians-are-making-crisis-worse/. 
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government supported the idea that COVID-19 was not as dangerous as it 
had been described and stated that everything was “under control.”43  
Authorities not only underestimated the economic impact of the pandemic but 
also delayed Rome’s response to COVID-19 until early March. 
When the Italian government finally enacted its decrees to manage 
COVID-19, it did so with little guidance for the regions.  The best example 
of this lack of coordination was the DPCM—adopted on March 8—
requiring the lockdown of the entire Lombardy region and some 
municipalities.44  Before the Prime Minister issued the decree, one of Italy’s 
most prestigious newspapers published its draft text.45  As a result, thousands 
of people left Milan to avoid being stuck in the so-called “red zone,” where 
the government would begin enforcing the lockdown the next day.46  All who 
left the red zone before the government enacted the decree contributed to 
spread the virus to the rest of the country—especially to its southern 
regions.47  Some regional governors prohibited citizens to return to their 
home regions to avoid further contamination.  It is plainly evident that better 
coordination between national measures and their regional implementation 
would have reduced the spread of COVID-19. 
By the end of February 2020, the Italian central government enacted 
numerous provisions to fight the virus in limited parts of Italy—namely 
Lombardy and other small municipalities.48  With the increasing spread of 
 
43. See Jamie Dettmer, Italy’s Moment of Viral Madness, VOA (Feb. 27, 2020, 9:12 AM), https:
//www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/italys-moment-viral-madness 
(noting in late February how many Italians did not trust the assurances and were taking their 
own measures). 
44. Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 8 marzo 2020, n.417, G.U. Mar. 8, 
2020, n.59. 
45. See Angela Giuffrida & Lorenzo Tondo, Leaked Coronavirus Plan to Quarantine 16m Sparks 
Chaos in Italy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2020, 11:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20
20/mar/08/leaked-coronavirus-plan-to-quarantine-16m-sparks-chaos-in-italy (explaining how 
the quarantine plan was leaked to the newspapers creating a panic). 
46. See Elizabeth Schumacher, Italy Fumbles Coronavirus Lockdown Orders, DW (Mar. 8, 2020), 
https://www.dw.com/en/italy-fumbles-coronavirus-lockdown-orders/a-52685263 (discussing 
how many people fled after learning of the decree); Marzio Toniolo, Inside Italy’s Coronavirus ‘Red 
Zone’ – Video Diary, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2020, 6:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
video/2020/feb/25/inside-italys-coronavirus-red-zone-video-diary (showing the life in the red 
zone during lockdowns). 
47. See Holly Ellyatt, ‘People Are Very Scared’: Southern Italians Brace Themselves as the Coronavirus 
Spreads Across the Country, CNBC (Mar. 31, 2020, 2:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/
31/southern-italians-brace-themselves-for-coronavirus-outbreak.html. 
48. See Marco Cecili & Andrea Chiappetta, Diritti fondamentali ed emergenza: come la pandemia 
covid-19 ha influenzato l’ordinamento giuridico e il bilanciamento dei diritti, in Francesco Saverio Marini 
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COVID-19, however, regional governors and city mayors began 
implementing their own lockdown measures to address the pandemic.  Two 
main examples come from regions that the central government had not 
declared red zones.  On February 22, the President of the Friuli Venezia Giulia 
region and a member of the Lega party, Massimiliano Fedriga, requested that 
the central government close the region’s territorial borders, but the central 
government denied his request.49  Before receiving subsequent authorization 
by the central government on March 21, the ‘governor’ adopted additional 
limitations and restricted the movements of the region’s residents.50 
Similarly, on February 26, Luca Ceriscioli, the President of the Marche 
region in central Italy and a member of the center-left party in the majority 
coalition, opposed the Italian government’s decision to declare the state of 
emergency only in the northern regions.  He unilaterally decided to close 
schools and suspend all public activities in the entire Marche region.51  The 
region acted without approval from the central government.52  The 
government responded by appealing the decision to the Regional 
Administrative Court, which suspended the President’s order.53  The 
Presidents of the Basilicata and Calabria regions hinted toward the adoption 
of “rebellious” regional ordinances aiming to limit the free movement to 
their regions.  These ordinances—intended for avoiding contagion from 
the “return” of students or workers in northern Italy returning to the 
southern regions— would have been in striking violation of Article 120 of 
the Italian Constitution. 54 
 
& Gino Scaccia, Emergenza Covid e Ordinamento Costituzionale 23–38 (G. Giappichelli ed., 2020) 
(containing the complete list of provisions passed by the Italian government). 
49. Coronavirus: Fedriga, Governo esclude controlli confini, ANSA, (Feb. 22, 2020, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/02/22/coronavirus-fedrigagoverno-
esclude-controlli-confini_3ee5d5a5-9b2b-4765-8175-66e7325e5401.html. 
50. Friuli Venezia Giulia, Ordinanza contingibile e urgente n. 4/PC (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://www.regione.fvg.it/rafvg/export/sites/default/RAFVG/salute-sociale/COVID19/
allegati/Ordinanza_4_PC_FVG_dd_21_03_2020.pdf. 
51. Coronavirus: Marche Asks to be Put on Contagion List, LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO 
(Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/english/1208015/coronavir
us-marche-asks-to-be-put-on-contagion-list.html. 
52. See id. (discussing Giuseppe Conte’s criticism of Marche’s decree and noting the legal 
challenge to it). 
53. TAR Reopens Marche Schools, Museums, ANSA (Feb. 27, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.an
sa.it/english/news/general_news/2020/02/27/tar-reopens-marche-schools-museums_d5792
28f-8825-4737-baa0-8e11d9d035ed.html. 
54. Art. 120 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (“Regions may not levy import or export or transit 
duties between Regions or adopt measures that in any way obstruct the freedom of movement 
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C. Learning by Monitoring: Turning Conflicts into Cooperation 
The conflicts that emerged between the national and regional governments 
underscored the need for more coordination.  In some cases, the Department 
for Civil Protection worked as a negotiator between regions and the central 
government, coordinating public health efforts by creating new hospitals and 
providing medical equipment.55  Although most regional governors, especially 
in the north, did not initially take the situation as seriously as they should have, 
they strictly implemented the national measures once the pandemic spread. 
On February 21, the Governor of Lombardy created an emergency task 
force, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Civil Protection, to 
manage the emergency intensive care unit (ICU).56  Before the outbreak, the 
total ICU capacity in Lombardy was approximately 720 beds.57  The 
COVID-19 task force was responsible for responding to the demand for 
increased ICU capacity and for implementing containment measures.58  The 
task force identified the most important public hospitals in the territory and 
asked them to implement targeted health measures.59  The regional 
governments participating in the task force allocated extra emergency 
funding, more health care workers, and additional equipment to ensure that 
patients who needed an ICU bed had one.60  One month later, the Italian 
government formed a new task force of 300 experts to help Lombardy cope 
with the health crisis.61  Following these efforts, the total ICU capacity in 
Lombardy rose to about 1,600 beds by late March.62 
 
of persons or goods between Regions.  Regions may not limit the right of citizens to work in 
any part whatsoever of the national territory.”). 
55. See De Nora Supports Italian Civil Protection Agencies in the Fight Against the Coronavirus – 
COVID-19 Pandemic, MED. DEVICE NEWS MAG. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://infomeddnews.com/
de-nora-supports-italian-civil-protection-agencies-in-the-fight-against-the-coronavirus-covid-
19-pandemic/. 
56. Giacomo Grasselli et al., Critical Care Utilization for the COVID-19 Outbreak in Lombardy, 






61. See Giada Zampano, Doctors Respond En Masse to Italy’s Call to Arms, ANADOLU AGENCY 
(Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/doctors-respond-en-masse-to-italys-
call-to-arms/1774991# (stating that the Italian government has opened bids for 300 
additional doctors). 
62. See Gallera: in Lombardia superati i 1600 posti in terapia intensive, ASKANEWS (Mar. 29, 2020, 
6:19 PM), http://www.askanews.it/cronaca/2020/03/29/gallera-in-lombardia-suprati-i-1600
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Another example of collaboration comes from Veneto, the second most-
affected region after Lombardy.  When cases of COVID-19 appeared in 
Veneto and the local businesses protested the negative impacts of the 
restrictive measures on the local economy, Governor Luca Zaia described 
the virus outbreak as a “media pandemic” or “wrong psychosis” and claimed 
the press had amplified the seriousness of the situation.63  But when the 
contagion spread, Zaia changed his position.64  He immediately established 
strict measures to isolate the positive cases in small municipalities, such as in 
Vò Euganeo, which offered most citizens coronavirus testing.65  Loyally 
cooperating with the central government, Governor Zaia quickly aligned his 
policies with directives coming from Rome and requested emergency powers 
to adopt more stringent measures than his neighbors.66 
A more collaborative approach can be found in the Piedmont region vis-à-
vis the containment of COVID-19’s spread inside the public retirement home, 
Residenze Sanitarie Assistenziali.  The Regional government, together with 
the Prefectures, the Provincial, and metropolitan city government of Turin, 
undersigned a Memorandum of Understanding on March 31, 2020, through 
which a set of operational guidelines from the Health Ministry were uniformly 
adopted throughout the region.67 
Even in the so-called Phase 2—which started May 4, 2020, ended the 
integral lockdown, and restarted commercial and industrial businesses—
numerous regional measures were introduced in patent violation of the 
 
-posti-in-terapia-intensiva-pn_20200329_00121/ (discussing the increase from 724 beds to 1,600 
added for intensive care). 
63. Veneto. Coronavirus. Zaia: “Conseguenze economiche disastrose. Psicosi sbagliata, pandemia 
mediatica,” AGENPRESS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.agenpress.it/2020/02/27/veneto-corona
virus-zaia-conseguenze-economiche-disastrose-psicosi-sbagliata-pandemia-mediatica/. 
64. See Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per la sua strada: «Non ritiro l'ordinanza: il limite è a 200 metri. 
Alimentari chiusi domenica», IL GAZZETTINO (Mar. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per 
la sua strada], https://www.ilgazzettino.it/nordest/primopiano/coronavirus_zaia_cosa_ha_dett
o_oggi_21_marzo_2020-5124408.html (discussing how the February 20 order will continue and 
citizens are required to respect the law). 
65. See Sabina Castelfranco, Italy’s Veneto Region to Test Everyone for Coronavirus, VOA (Mar. 
24, 2020, 2:51 PM), https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/italys-ve
neto-region-test-everyone-coronavirus (explaining the large-scale testing that was put into action). 
66. See Coronavirus, Zaia avanti per la sua strada, supra note 64 (explaining Zaia’s response to 
the restrictive order and maintaining its enforcement). 
67. See Protocollo d’intesa fra unita’ di crisio- Regione Piemonte, Prefettura di Torino 
(anche per le altre preffeture del Piemonte), Cita’ metropolitana e Province del Piemonte (Mar. 
31, 2020), https://www.regione.piemonte.it/web/sites/default/files/media/documenti/2020-
04/protocollo_rsa.pdf (containing the relevant guidelines). 
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governmental directives.68  Veneto and Lombardy, for example, enacted more 
severe restrictions than the ones provided for by the central government.69  On 
the contrary, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Tuscany, and Calabria regions lifted 
the lockdown measures before they were allowed to do so by the central 
government.70  Let us take, for example, the ordinance of the President of 
Calabria—later challenged by the central government and declared void by 
Administrative Regional Tribunal (TAR)— allowed food outlets based in the 
region to provide carryout catering, which seemingly anticipated “Phase 2.”71 
In essence, Italy’s intergovernmental cooperation was an exercise of 
learning by monitoring or, as stated in Charles Sabel’s well-known essay,72 an 
attempt to overcome the conflict between learning and monitoring through a 
continuous feedback loop among regional, local, and national administration 
that happened in both a vertical and horizontal manner.  Over the first phase 
of prompt reaction to COVID-19, regions were entitled to take part in the 
decisionmaking process to draft the measures aimed at tackling the 
pandemic.73  However, they had neither a veto power nor a power of proposal.  
As a result, the central government was free to unilaterally adopt any measure, 
without co-deciding it with the regions.  Moreover, the boundaries between 
the state emergency powers, the power of all of the 8,000 Italian mayors to 
enact contingent and urgent ordinances for health reasons, and the power of 
the regional governors to set ordinances safeguarding the public health were 
far from clearly defined. 
After the regions began to rebel against state regulations, thus 
demonstrating that coordination among institutions did not work well, Art. 
2 of Law Decree no. 19/202074 vested the regions with the power to propose 
 
68. Phase Two: What Changes in Italy from May 4th?, LOCAL (May 4, 2020, 8:25 AM), https:
//www.thelocal.it/20200504/phase-two-what-changes-in-italy-from-may-4th. 
69. Chiara Berardi et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy: Policy and Technology Impact on 
Health and Non-health Outcomes, 9 HEALTH POL’Y TECH. 454, 461 (2020), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7467905/pdf/main.pdf. 
70. Valentina Di Donato, Italian Region of Calabria to Begin Relaxation of Lockdown Measures, 
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-04-30-20-intl/h_364
55217d614dd89e21904c3a8df6098 (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:56 PM). 
71. Il Tar Calabria si esprime sull’annulamento dell’ordinanza del President della Regione Calabria del 
29 aprile 2020, n. 37., IL DRITTO AMMINISTRAVITO (May 9, 2020), https://www.ildirittoamm
inistrativo.it/Tar-Calabria-si-esprime-annullamento-ordinanza-Presidente-della-Regione-
Calabria-29-aprile-2020-n-37/ult1329. 
72. Charles Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in HANDBOOK 
OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Columbia L. Sch. Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 
102, 1993), http://www3.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Learning%20by%20Monitoring.pdf. 
73. D.L. n. 6/2020 art. 3(1) (It.). 
74. Decreto legge 25 marzo 2020, n.19, art II, G.U. Mar. 25, 2020, n.79. 
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and modify emergency COVID measures, even when the central 
government’s measures were intended to be applied uniformly throughout 
the national territory.  Furthermore, Art. 3 of the same Law Decree no. 
19/202075 authorized the regions to adopt more stringent supplementary 
measures than national ones in the event of an increase in the contagion 
index in their territory. 
The different measures implemented by municipalities in Italy, and the 
missteps taken by regional leaders, show how initial conflicts between central 
and regional governments can eventually be turned into enhanced 
cooperation. 76  However, to avoid Italy’s missteps and learn from its 
successes, local governments around the world should seek ways to cooperate 
and learn by monitoring for a common purpose to share, both horizontally 
and vertically, the most effective measures to respond to the pandemic.77 
II. THE COST OF A WIDESPREAD LOCKDOWN 
A. Legal Inflation, Governmental Paternalism, and  
the Bureaucratization of Social Norms 
The Italian model as a response to the spreading of COVID-19 differed 
from the approach that many other EU countries implemented as a 
response to this pandemic.78  If almost every country limited fundamental 
rights by balancing these restrictions against the protection of public health, 
the Italian government used this balancing to justify a widespread 
lockdown for sixty-nine days.  On top of the long lockdown, the 
government applied one-size-fits-all regulations that were not tailored to 
the different regions, producing overregulation that constrained the 
 
75. Id. art. III. 
76. See Giovanni Di Cosimo & Giacomo Menegus, L’emergenza Coronavirus tra Stato e Regioni: 
alla ricerca della leale collaborazione, BIOLAW J. (SPECIAL ISSUE), May 2020, at 183.  For a 
discussion of similar matters in the U.S. context, see Sheila R. Foster, As COVID-19 Proliferates 
Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes in Conflicts with Their Governors, GEO. L., https://www.law.
georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid-19-proliferates-mayors-take-response-lead-sometimes-in-
conflicts-with-their-governors/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
77. Rebecca Katz et al., A Mayoral Network for Pandemic Preparedness, GLOB. POL’Y J. (June 
21, 2018), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/21/06/2018/mayoral-network-pand
emic-preparedness (providing an example of horizontal and vertical cooperation in pandemic 
preparedness of U.S. cities). 
78. See generally Arianna Vedaschi, Il Covid-19, l’ultimo stress test per gli ordinamenti democratici: 
uno sguardo comparato, 43 DPCE ONLINE 1453, 1461, 1463–65 (2020), http://www.dpceonline
.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/1015/988 (providing a comparative view on how 
western democracies have reacted to COVID-19). 
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intimate life of its citizens, ultimately leading to a bureaucratization of 
social life.79 
During that time, the regulatory measures adopted by the Italian 
government were pervasive and very detailed.80  Rather than releasing a 
general preventative framework relying on the citizens’ self-preservation, the 
regulations were hyper-detailed and enforced with high penalties.  Between 
January 30 and April 26, the central government and Parliament passed more 
than twenty measures via laws, decrees, and ordinances; the Civil Protection 
issued more than twenty ordinances; the Ministry for Health issued more than 
one hundred ordinances; and the Ministry for Internal Affairs issued thirteen 
decrees.81  As early as the end of April, all issued state rules had filled more than 
1,100 pages of the Official Journal, where Italian laws are published.82  Finally, 
because Law Decree no. 6/2020 enabled regions and municipalities to specify 
and tighten the governmental orders through local regulations, regional 
Governors, mayors, and local authorities enacted a wave of new rules.83 
Consequently, the overregulation of the lockdown orders resulted in a 
patchwork of ambiguous, sometimes contradictory rules, full of references to 
national, regional, or European laws and regulations.  This complex regulatory 
web was impossible for civil servants, politicians, and professionals to grasp, let 
alone citizens who were at a loss in this legislative jungle.  The bureaucratization 
of every aspect of their social life spurred among Italians a Kafkian critique of 
an overzealous government that micromanaged, not always very effectively, its 
response to the spread of the pandemic.84 
 
79. See Andrea Chiappetta, Less Regulation for Better Regulation: ipertrofia normativa e pressappochismo 
linguistico ai tempi della pandemia da Covid-19, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, June 15, 2020, 
at 717, 722–25, http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
45-Chiappetta-FQC-2-20.pdf (noting specific examples of how vaguely worded DPCMs meant 
to clarify restrictions actually create further confusion and limit freedoms of citizens); Nicoletta 
Rangone, Italy’s Complex Legislative Framework Impairs Its COVID-19 Response, REGUL. REV. (June 8, 
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/06/08/rangone-italy-complex-legislative-framew
ork-impairs-covid-19-response/ (discussing the complex and shifting administrative requirements 
placed on citizens leaving home for authorized activities). 
80. See Italian Government Actions, INT’L CTR. THEORETICAL PHYSICS, https://www.ictp.it/
ictp_covidresponse/italian-government-actions.aspx#close (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
81. See Cecili & Chiappetta, supra note 48, at 23–30. 
82. Giuliano Armeno, Covid, in 54 giorni oltre mille pagine di norme: Scaccia e la giungla delle leggi, 
ALESSIO PORCU (May 6, 2020), https://www.alessioporcu.it/articoli/gino-scaccia-giungla-
mille-leggi-emergenza-covid/. 
83. D.L. n. 6/2020 (It.). 
84. See, e.g., Francesco Orofino, Kafka, il coronavirus e l’architettura nel Paese del “combinato 
disposto,” ONE LISTONE GIORDANO, https://one.listonegiordano.com/architettura/kafka-il-
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One example is the self-certification that every resident had to carry with 
them when leaving their homes to go to work, to shop, or to the pharmacy.  
The self-certification’s online format changed multiple times, which caused 
a panic among citizens to ensure they printed the correct form.  In the streets, 
police checked for self-certifications, and the inability to produce proper 
documentation resulted in the police levying fines or sending citizens back 
home.85  Another example is the interpretative dilemma created by the 
notion of “congiunti,” or “family members,” in the DPCM of April 26, 2020, 
which considered the movement to meet another family member” necessary 
and therefore legal.86  However, the definition of congiunti does not appear in 
the Italian Civil Code.  Therefore, the question was whether it included 
cohabitants or same-sex partners—especially when these relations do not fall 
under the legal categorization that only includes married couples. 
As Antonio Baldassarre, the emeritus President of the Constitutional Court, 
pointed out, such interpretation would have privileged only family members 
because it left out those not included in the traditional nuclear family,87 
including same-sex partners or cohabitants.  The central government 
immediately clarified that congiunti included “affetti stabili,”88 or “stable 
relationships”—a definition that, rather than clarifying, created even more 
confusion.  For instance, would a long-term mistress be included within this 
definition, or a long-term friendship between widows?  Due to the vagueness 
and difficulty to qualify these family ties, it is not surprising that public 
authorities have generally preferred not to levy fines based on that part of the 
said DPCM. 
 
coronavirus-e-larchitettura-nel-paese-del-combinato-disposto/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021); 
Eliana Agata Marchese, Autocertificazione firmata da Kafka, L’ADIGE.IT (May 7, 2020, 1:14 PM), 
https://www.ladige.it/blogs/diario-mamma-prof/2020/05/07/autocertificazione-firmata-
kafka; I Meme più divertenti sui Dpcm di Conte e sulle autocertificazioni, IL FARO (Mar. 25, 2020, 12:00 
PM), https://www.ilfaroonline.it/2020/03/25/i-meme-piu-divertenti-sui-dpcm-di-conte-e-
sulle-autocertificazioni/328221/. 
85. Alessandro Di Paola & Gabriel Frasca, Riflessioni critiche in tema di Covid 19 e 
autocertificazione, AVVOCATOANDREANI (Apr. 8, 2020), https://news.avvocatoandreani.it/arti
coli/riflessioni-critiche-tema-covid-autocertificazione-105690.html. 
86. Alfonso Celotto, Chi sono i nostri congiunti in diritto? Lo spiega Celotto, FORMICHE (Apr. 27, 
2020), https://formiche.net/2020/04/fas-2-congiunti-diritto/. 
87. Roberta Lanzara, Baldassarre: “Dpcm in tutto incostituzionale,” ADNKRONOS (Apr. 27, 
2020, 5:46 PM), https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2020/04/27/baldassarre-dpcm-
tutto-incostituzionale_NCkg79J8eVOblBGG6m3byH.html. 
88. See Coronavirus: Italia verso la Fase 2, ok alle visite ai congiunti, compresi fidanzati e ‘affetti stabili,’ 
ANSA.IT (May 1, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/27/
coronavirus-litalia-verso-la-fase-2-fra-cautele-e-polemiche_1faa2a81-9e44-4e67-b733-0e0e0d
c1177e.html. 
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B. The Italian Parliament as Sleeping Beauty 
To face the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian government relied on two 
main forms of regulations: law decrees and Presidential Decrees adopted by 
the Prime Minister.  While law decrees are specifically designed in the Italian 
Constitution to deal with emergencies, Presidential Decrees adopted by the 
Prime Minister do not have the same legal force as laws.  During this 
emergency situation, the government has used DPCMs broadly to fight the 
spread of the virus, limiting fundamental rights enshrined in the Italian 
Constitution protecting personal liberty,89 freedom of movement,90 freedom 
of assembly,91 freedom to profess religious belief,92 right to education,93 and 
right to economic enterprise initiative.94  While these constitutional rights are 
not absolute, the possibility to limit them stems from Parliament’s exclusive 
adoption of laws.  Therefore, DPCMs are administrative provisions and are 
not the correct legislative instrument envisaged by the Constitution to 
restrain fundamental rights. 
The numerous DPCMs adopted by the government to contain the spread 
of the pandemic cannot be legally grounded on Article 78 of the Italian 
Constitution, even broadly interpreted.  This provision allows the central 
government to enact decrees having the force of law only in case of war.95  Such 
a speculation could hardly be supported here because public health 
emergencies, although in some scholars’ view are “like a war,” 96 are different 
from wars declared between nation states and approved by parliaments.  
Additionally, Article 78 allows the entire government, not the Prime Minister 
alone, to enact such decrees.  Finally, the government can act under Article 78 
only if explicitly authorized by the Parliament.  Currently, the Italian 
government’s justification for using DPCMs rather than law decrees is 
grounded in the need to speed up the adoption of emergency measures.  
However, marginalizing the role of the Parliament is dangerous to democracy. 
While many measures were introduced through DPCMs, the most 
powerful set of norms was enacted with the Cure Italy Decree.  This 
 
89. Art. 13 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
90. Art. 16 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
91. Art. 17 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
92. Art. 19 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
93. Art. 33 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
94. Art. 41 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
95. “Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary powers 
into the Government.”  Art. 78 COSTITUZIONE [COST.]. 
96. Angela Giuffrida, ‘This Is Like a War’: View from Italy’s Coronavirus Frontline, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 17, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/17/this-is-like-
a-war-view-from-italys-coronavirus-frontline. 
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provision included a massive package of financial measures by the Italian 
government in support of families, workers, and enterprises.97  An extensive 
political debate should have ensued in Parliament over the scope and value 
of these financial measures.  For this reason, it was extremely important for 
the Italian Parliament to meet and have the main legislative body initiate 
proceedings for the transposition of the provisional law decrees into law.  
However, just like Sleeping Beauty, the Parliament was slow to get in motion 
and was awakened by the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, who 
recalled the relevance of democratic deliberations and that the government 
should work on a multipartisan platform before Parliament to transparently 
debate how to reasonably balance respect for fundamental freedoms and the 
need to protect public health.98 
Despite the presidential wishes, the government continued to adopt the 
most powerful set of policies with no meaningful consultation of 
parliamentary minorities.  On the contrary, the government limited the 
parliamentary debate through a special approval procedure called “vote of 
confidence,” which is frequently used by the Executive to make all the 
proposed parliamentary amendments fall with a single vote and thus restricts 
the parliamentary bargaining.  The most important governmental acts, 
namely the already mentioned Cure Italy Decree and Liquidity Decree, 
followed this procedure.  The Parliament did not meet as a full body since 
the number of members that could attend each session was limited.  
Therefore, a robust discussion of the legislation did not happen in person nor 
electronically.  In fact, Article 64 of the Constitution and dozens of internal 
regulations of the Parliament remain vague as to the possibility of an “online” 
deliberation.99  Although initially absent and through a slow adaptation, the 
Parliament finally amended some of the governmental decrees and managed 
to speed up the democratic legislative process. 
C. A Targeted and Decentralized Regulatory Approach 
The regional “rebel” measures highlighted above show two flaws in the 
government’s emergency policies: the weak institutional cooperation and the 
 
97. See Tega & Massa, supra note 34. 
98. Barbara Tedalddi, Mattarella chiama governo e opposizione e chiede unita, AGENZIA ITALIA 
(March 19, 2020), https://www.agi.it/politica/news/2020-03-19/coronavirus-mattarella-
conte-salvini-meloni-berlusconi-7685147/. 
99. See Gino Scaccia & Andrea Carboni, Funzionalità del Parlamento e modalità di voto 
nell’emergenza, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, Aug. 4, 2020, at 122–25, http://www.
forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/12-Scaccia-Carboni-FQC-
3-20.pdf (discussing the different interpretions on meaning and scope of Article 64’s definition 
of “presence” and its effect on parliamentary procedure during COVID-19).   
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lack of targeted, differentiated, and decentralized regulations.  The principle 
of regulatory differentiation is expressed in Article 118 of the Constitution, 
along with the subsidiarity principle of enabling by default local authorities to 
exercise administrative powers unless they are unable to do so and a national 
measure is needed.  Because the virus spread in the Italian territory with 
elevated contagions in the north, very limited contagions in the center, and 
almost nonexistent contagions in large parts of southern Italy, the one-size-fits-
all regulatory approach of the government inevitably clashed with the principle 
of differentiation.  It also clashed with the principle of proportionality because 
the government applied regulations in a uniform manner, even when the 
contagion was decreasing.100  The lockdown measures not only targeted the 
northern regions but also territories where the pandemic was almost absent.  
This limited the fundamental rights of the residents in those non-infected 
regions and possibly violated the principle of proportionality, as it is recognized 
in Italian and EU constitutional law.101 
In a second regulatory phase, however, the Italian government turned to 
a more tailored and decentralized approach, giving more regulatory space to 
the regions.  For instance, in approaching the economic reopening, the 
government delegated to the regional presidents the responsibility to 
differentiate the anti-COVID-19 measures on the territory.  In particular, 
Article 1, paragraph 14 of Law Decree no. 33/2020 tasked the regions to 
adopt a regulatory framework to prevent or reduce the risks of contagion for 
 
100. See Gino Scaccia & Christian D’Orazi, La concorrenza fra Stato e autonomie territoriali nella 
gestione della crisi sanitaria fra unitarietà e differenziazione, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, Aug 
4. 2020, at 117, http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/
11-Scaccia-DOrazi-FQC-3-20.pdf.   
101. Proportionality is a key concept in global constitutionalism.  For a deep analysis of the 
principle, see PETER LERCHE, ÜBERMASS UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT: ZUR BINDUNG DES 
GESETZGEBERS AN DIE GRUNDSÄTZE DER VERHÄLTNISMÄßIGKEIT UN DER ERFORDERLICHKEIT 
(1961); see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (2010).  The Italian 
Constitutional Court has stated that “reasonableness and proportionality . . . are general 
constraints of the legislative action intended to limit individual rights.” Corte Cost. [Constitutional 
Court], 9 gennaio 1997, n.1, G.U. (spec. ser.), Jan. 15, 1997, n.3 (It.) (translation by the Authors).  
The proportionality test is widespread in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and of many constitutional courts all over the 
world.  See generally Gino Scaccia, Proportionality and the Balancing of Rights in the Case-law of EU Courts, 
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the return to economic and social activities.102  This decentralized approach 
undertaken by the Italian government did not happen without conflicts with 
the regions or ambiguities in its implementation; although, at the declaratory 
level, the government embraced the regional framework in its DPCM of May 
17, 2020.103  Some regions, however, almost in protest against the government 
because of the lack of guidelines for security measures, postponed the 
reopening of their economic activities. 
Decentralization and differentiation in the economic reopening of Italy 
should not undermine the effectiveness of such regulatory measures.  
However, this is what happened with the smart monitoring and tracing 
systems of the contagion that the government attempted to establish through 
downloadable applications on the citizens’ smartphones.  The government 
set up an app called “Immuni,” or “Immune,” that was sent to all residents 
to download on their cell phones.  Even though there are sixty million 
people in Italy owning about eighty million smartphones—demonstrating 
how many Italians own multiple devices—the app was downloaded by only 
nine million inhabitants.104  Since the Immuni App did not achieve the 
critical mass of downloads to realize the tracing goal for which it was 
created, this was a huge setback for the Italian government.  Part of this 
debacle was driven by the Italians’ lack of trust in the government and, in 
particular, lack of trust in a tracing system perceived as too invasive of their 
privacy.105  In addition, the competition with similar apps created by the 
regions led to a duplication and confusion in the implementation of 
monitoring regimes.106  This lack of coordination triggered even more 
misperception in the general public and undermined the regulatory strategy 
of contact tracing of COVID-19. 
 
102. Decreto legge 16 maggio 2020, n.33, G.U. May 16, 2020, n.125. 
103. Decreto Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 17 maggio 2020, n.1058, G.U. May 
17, 2020, n.126. 
104. Roberta Zanon, Report Digital 2020: lo scenario nel mondo e in Italia, DIGIT. 
DICTIONARY: BLOG (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.digitaldictionary.it/blog/report-digital-
2020-scenario-digitale-mondo-e-italia (reporting 2020 Internet and social media trends and 
statistics in Italy); Immuni: Here’s What You Need to Know About Using Italy’s Contact-tracing App, 
LOCAL (Oct. 6, 2020, 9:13 AM), https://www.thelocal.it/20201006/immuni-heres-what-
you-need-to-know-about-using-italys-contact-tracing-app. 
105. See Martina Cardone & Marco Cecili, Osservazioni sulla disciplina in materia di tutela dei 
dati personali in tempi di Covid-19. L’Italia e i modelli sudcoreano, israeliano e cinese: opzioni a confronto, 
NOMOS-LE ATTUALITÀ DEL DIRITTO (2020), http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Cardone-Cecili-1-2020-REV-1.pdf. 
106. See Michele Paolo, Why Italy’s Contact Tracing Is Not Working, ITALICS MAG. (Nov. 11, 
2020), https://italicsmag.com/2020/11/11/why-italys-contact-tracing-is-not-working/. 
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CONCLUSION: BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH COOPERATION AND 
GOVERNMENTAL DISTRUST 
In March 2020, the European Central Bank issued a new asset purchase 
plan worth €750 billion, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP), lasting until the end of 2020 to support the liquidity and the financial 
condition of all sectors of the Eurozone economy.107  This measure has 
greatly benefited the Italian government, whose economy was halted due to 
a granularly implemented lockdown throughout the Italian territory that 
came at a high cost.  The stress test for Italian institutions included an 
empowered executive branch, that only after a late fine-tuning through 
learning by monitoring adjustment, overcame conflicts with the regions to 
become an effective model of regional-national cooperation for public health 
policies.  In a second phase, both the regions and the Parliament had to learn 
how to adapt to the new mode of governance established by the government.  
During this phase, the role of President Sergio Mattarella was central in 
reestablishing the institutional balance in governing the country by insisting 
on the need for greater involvement of the legislative branch and the regions 
in executive decisionmaking. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of the Italian 
constitutional and administrative system, especially on how to manage a 
national emergency in exceptional circumstances.  In order to be effective 
and timely, during the first phase of the pandemic, the government 
centralized its decisionmaking while marginalizing both regions and the 
Parliament.  The dialectic between the different levels of governments 
through regionalism, as well as between the executive and the legislative 
branches, are an integral part of the pluralist constitutional Italian style.108  
However, after some initial central-regional conflicts, the Italian system 
reached a new equilibrium that has allowed the institutions to cooperate 
democratically.  This learning by monitoring process in national–regional 
cooperation entailed the sharing of information and the monitoring of public 
health policies that succeeded in containing the spread of the pandemic and 
eventually enabled the reopening of the Italian economy. 
 
 
107. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) was announced by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in the press release on March 18, 2020.  ECB Announces €750 
Billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), EUR. CTR. BANK (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.htm
l.  See generally Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), EUR. CTR. BANK, https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
108. See Vittoria BARSOTTI ET AL., ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 231 (2016). 
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The lesson learned during the COVID-19 pandemic was that during a 
public health emergency, it was necessary to shorten the chain of command 
and practice stricter coordination between national and regional public 
health administrations.  Part of the reason why this tighter practice did not 
happen earlier was the lack of constitutional and administrative frameworks 
defining the roles and responsibilities of each actor involved in the crisis. 
Finally, the government’s response to the pandemic also exposed traditional 
weaknesses of the Italian system, which include: overregulation; overlapping 
of state, regional, and municipal regulatory competencies on the same 
territory; and finally, excessive bureaucratization that paralyzed economic and 
social life throughout the country.  In fact, during the spread of the pandemic, 
Italians were micromanaged by an overzealous government that transformed 
them into vulnerable citizens who had to expose even their most intimate 
relations to public authorities in order to leave their homes.  In hindsight, 
rather than adopting a wave of regulations in a frantic and paternalistic effort 
to protect its citizens, restricting individual liberties, and educating citizens on 
how to behave, the government could have empowered citizens by asking 
them to take more responsibilities and duties and forgone imposing high fines 
and criminal sanctions for those who did not comply with the lockdown 
measures.  While this governmental approach has eroded some of the public 
trust that citizens had in the current administration, making it difficult to 
implement similar measures in the future, the model of regional cooperation 
in public health and the renewed effort to establish democratic parliamentary 
cooperation with the executive branch will stay in place. 
 
